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-1. I am Dirk Voorhoof, prof. emeritus at Ghent University, Belgium. I’m a member of the Executive 
Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) and of the Human Rights 
Centre at the Law Faculty of Ghent University. I have been teaching for more than 25 years courses 
on Media Law, Copyright Law and Journalism & Ethics at Ghent University and since 2005 I’m  
lecturing European Media Law at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark (UCPH). From 1995 to 
2005 I was a member of the Federal Commission for Access to Administrative Documents in Belgium, 
and the last ten years I was a member of the Flemish Media Regulator (VRM). I have also written a 
series of legal opinions and participated in seminars and conferences as an expert for the Council of 
Europe, all in relation with media law, access to information, freedom of expression and media and 
journalism. I’m a member of Legal Human Academy, of the CMPF Scientific Committee, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, the Global FOE&I 
@Columbia experts network, Columbia University, New York, and the Committee of Experts on 
Internet intermediaries (MSI-NET) of the Council of Europe. I have written books, articles and reports 
on developments regarding freedom of expression, media and journalism in Europe, including in Iris, 
legal newsletter of the European Audiovisual Observatory, Auteurs & Media and Mediaforum. Some 
of my recent publications include: “Freedom of Expression, Media and Journalism under the 
European Human Rights System: Characteristics, Developments, and Challenges”, in P. MOLNÁR 
(ed.), Free Speech and Censorship Around the Globe, Central European University Press, Budapest - 
New York, 2015, 59-104; “Freedom of Journalistic Newsgathering, Access to Information and 
Protection of Whistle-blowers under Article 10 ECHR and the standards of the Council of Europe”, in 
Council of Europe, Journalism at Risk. Threats, challenges and perspectives, Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg,  2015, 105-143; “Freedom of Expression and the Right to Information : Implications for 
Copyright”, in C. GEIGER (ed.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, 
Edward Elgar Publ., Cheltenham – Northampton, 2015, 331-353. I’m also the co-author of the free 
online e-book Freedom  of  Expression,  the  Media  and  Journalists:  Case-law  of  the  European  
Court  of Human Rights (also available in French and German. A new 2017 version is to made 
available at the website of the European Audiovisual Observatory). Actually I’m co-organising a 
Conference on Promoting Dialogue between the European Court of Human Rights and the Freedom 
of Expression Community, Strasbourg 24 March 2017, https://ecpmf.eu/events/ecpmfecthr2017  
 
Most of my research output and publications (of which some in English) are online available at 
https://biblio.ugent.be/person/801000461819. 
I have also conducted research and participated in a research project with regard the protection of 
human rights in the employment relation, in which I specifically focused on the right to freedom of 
expression and information. This resulted in several publications in books, legal journals or reports1. 
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 Dirk Voorhoof and Patrick Humblet, “The Right to Freedom of Expression in the Workplace under Article 10 ECHR” in Filip 
Dorssemont, Klaus Lörcher and Isabelle Schömann (eds.), The European Convention of Human Rights and the Employment 
Relation, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013, 237-286; Dirk Voorhoof and Patrick Humblet, “Human Rights and the Employment 
 
 
 
-2. I have been requested by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to prepare this expert 
declaration in the case of Rocio San Miguel Sosa and others v. Venezuela, in the case nr. 12.923, 
and I have read the Commission’s report on the merits of this case, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.156, Doc. 21 of 28 
October 2015. 
-3. It is the first time I’m requested as an expert for assistance in a procedure before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. I have never been in Venezuela, and I have no contacts with the 
government, nor with any other Venezuelan authorities, nor with the applicants or their counsels in 
the case at issue. I only learnt about the case through the documents send to me by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. 
-4. I have been invited by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights to prepare a legal 
opinion/expert testimony focusing on the right to (political) freedom of expression and information 
of civil servants, i.e. “on the international human rights standards applicable to the right to freedom 
of expression of public servants, specifically in terms of the scope of right of those servants to 
maintain and express opinions of a political nature, with reference to international and comparative 
jurisprudence and doctrine” (Resolution issued by the President of the IACtHR on 20 December 
2016)2.  
This report will focus on the right to (political) freedom of expression and information of civil 
servants from the perspective of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ECHR)3, presenting and analyzing the relevant case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR) , the ECtHR being perceived as the “centre of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Relation. The Right to Freedom of Expression at Work”, in X., Proceedings of the International Conference on the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Employment Relation, Actes du Colloque “La convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme et la relation de travail”, CNRS and Strasbourg University, 30-31 January 2014, 33 p., http://europa-
cnrs.unistra.fr/fileadmin/upload/DUN/europe_en_mutation/Documents/e-publi/E-publi_CEDH_et_la_relation_au_travail_-
_D_Voorhoof_P_Humblet_v0-1.pdf and http://europa-cnrs.unistra.fr/publications/les-e-publi/e-publi-des-unites/; Dirk 
Voorhoof and Jacques Englebert, “La liberté d’expression syndicale mise à mal par la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme”, (ECtHR 8 December 2009, Aguilera Jiménez e.a. v. Spain), Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, 2010/83, 
733-747; Dirk Voorhoof and Ronan O’ Fathaigh, “Grand Chamber Judgment on Trade Union Freedom of Expression”, 
Strasbourg Observers Blog, 14 September 2011, http://strasbourgobservers.com/2011/09/14/grand-chamber-judgment-
on-trade-union-freedom-of-expression/#more-1143 and Dirk Voorhoof, “Is the protection of “public welfare” an inherent 
and justified restriction on the right to freedom of expression? Comment on the Sixth Periodic Report by the Japanese 
Government under Article 40 ICCPR (April 2012) and the judgment of 7 July 2011 of the Supreme Court in the case of Mr. 
Katsuhisa Fuijta”, Legal Opinion on request of Human Rights Organisations Group, Japan, 28 March 2013, as part of the 
monitoring procedure by the UN Human Rights Committee, 
http://wind.ap.teacup.com/people/html/20130328voorhoof.japan.fujita.pdf and 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/JPN/INT_CCPR_NGO_JPN_14887_E.pdf 
2
 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/sanmiguel_sosa_20_12_16.pdf 
3
 Article 10 ECHR : 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of 
these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. See also Dirk Voorhoof, “Freedom of 
Expression, Media and Journalism under the European Human Rights System: Characteristics, Developments, and 
Challenges”, in Peter Molnàr (ed.), Free Speech and Censorship Around the Globe, Central European University Press, 
Budapest - New York, 2015, 59-104 and -, Freedom of Expression under the European Human Rights System. From Sunday 
Times (n° 1) v. U.K. (1979) to Hachette Filipacchi Associés (“Ici Paris”) v. France (2009), Inter-American and European Human 
Rights Journal / Revista Interamericana y Europa de Derechos Humanos, 2009/1-2, 3-49. 
 
 
gravity of human rights in Europe”4, while also referring to the standards of the right to political 
freedom of expression (of public servants) under Article 19 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (hereafter ICCPR)5. 
- First this report examines the preliminary question whether signing a statement or a 
petition in a political context, such as a petition to carry out a recall referendum on the term 
of office of a head of state, is to be considered as an act of exercising the right to express a 
(political) opinion (by a civil servant or employee in the public sector), guaranteed by Article 
19.2 ICCPR and/or Article 10 § 1 ECHR. 
 
- Second it will analyze under what circumstances a termination of employment contract or 
dismissal of an employer or civil servant is to be regarded as an interference with the right to 
freedom of expression, and in particular in case the public authority or employer bring 
forward that the termination of contract or dismissal is unrelated to the exercise of the right 
to freedom of expression by the employee or civil servant. 
 
- Next this report will focus on the (limits of the) right to political freedom of expression in 
the employment relation, including the public sector, and on the (limitations of the) right to 
express political, critical or non-neutral opinions about the head of state, the government or 
other public institutions. Therefore it will elaborate on the criteria and conditions that may 
justify an interference with the right to (political) freedom of expression of public servants 
and employees in the public sector. It will also clarify in what circumstances an interference 
with this right amounts to a violation of Article 19 ICCPR or Article 10 ECHR, with references 
to the UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 34 “Article 19. Freedoms of 
opinion and expression”6 and especially analyzing and reporting the relevant case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights7. 
-5. The option to examine in this report the impact of Article 19 ICCPR on the right to freedom of 
expression, is because the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela acceded and ratified the ICCPR on 10 
May 1978 and is bound to the respect of the human rights guaranteed by the UN Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights8. Therefore this report includes references to the case law of the UN HRC 
applying Article 19 ICCPR as reflected in the UN HRC General Comment No. 34 on the freedoms of 
                                                          
4
 Dean Spielmann, president of the Court in 2014, at the opening address of the Dialogue between Judges 2014, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2014_ENG.pdf, p. 5. 
5
 Article 19 ICCPR: 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. 
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may 
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For 
respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or 
of public health or morals. 
6
 General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, UN HRC 12 September 2011, at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf  
7
 As the mandate and perspective of this report is not to analyse the facts and legal aspects of the case of Rocio San Miguel 
Sosa and others v. Venezuela, nr. 12.923 under Article 13 ACHR, the aspects referred to in the additional questions referred 
to by the Secretariat of the IACHR in its communication of 20 January 2017 (DOC CDH-3-2016/40) will be integrated in the 
report and examined from the international framework as mentioned, that is Article 19 ICCPR and Article 10 ECHR. 
8
 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en  
 
 
opinion and expression.9 The reason to focus on the application of Article 10 ECHR, is because the 
case law of the ECtHR with regard the right to freedom of expression and information is extensive 
and elaborated10 and is therefore an interesting instructional basis for analyzing issues affecting the 
right to freedom of expression, also outside the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. As the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela is no member State to the ECHR, this report’s ambition is to facilitate and contribute to 
the interaction and “judicial dialogue”11 between the IACtHR and the ECtHR. 
The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber judgments in the cases of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 
February 2005, Appl. nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99 (paras. 49-53, 112, 116 and 124) and Marguš v. 
Croatia, 27 May 2014, Appl. no. 4455/10 (paras. 56-66, 111, 131 and 138) illustrate pertinently how 
the ECtHR refers to, takes into consideration or is inspired by the reasoning in the jurisprudence of 
the IACtHR. The European Court’s Grand Chamber has also referred to the Inter-American Court’s 
case law and/or the Inter-American Commission reports or submissions in cases involving the right to 
freedom of expression such as in Stoll v. Switzerland, 10 December 2007, Appl. no. 69698/01 (paras. 
43 and 111), Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain, 12 September 2011, Appl. nos. 28955/06, 
28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06 (paras. 25-26 and 56), and Baka v. Hungary (paras. 84-85, 114 
and the joint concurring opinion of judges Pinto de Albuquerque and Dedov12).  
In its recent Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, 8 
November 2016, Appl. no. 18030/11 (Grand Chamber), the ECtHR refers explicitly to the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR in support of the right of access to public documents as a right 
guaranteed under Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court quotes 
extensively from the IACtHR judgment in the case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile (19  September 
2006). Referring to these and other international standards of law and jurisprudence, the ECtHR 
broadened the scope of the right of freedom to expression under Article 10 ECHR as to include, 
under circumstances, a right of access to public documents. The Grand Chamber  considered that it 
was “instructive” “for the Court’s inquiry to have regard to the developments concerning the 
recognition of a right of access to information in other regional human-rights protection systems. The 
most noteworthy is the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s interpretation of Article 13 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, as set out in the case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, which 
expressly guarantees a right to seek and receive information. The Inter-American Court considered 
that the right to freedom of thought and expression included the protection of the right of access to 
State-held information” (para. 146). 
 
                                                          
9
 Notice that also in some recent cases, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR refers to Article 19/20 ICCPR and the UN HRC 
General Comment No. 34 for interpreting the scope and application of Article 10 ECHR: ECtHR Grand Chamber Perinçek v. 
Switzerland, 15 October 2015, Appl. no. 27510/08, paras. 66-73 and 265 (on memory laws and denial of genocide) and 
ECtHR Grand Chamber Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, 8 November 2016, Appl. no. 18030/11, paras. 38-41 and 140-
143 (on access to public documents). 
10
 See J. Casadevall, E. Myjer, M. O’Boyle and A. Austin (eds.), Freedom of Expression: Essays in Honour of Nicolos Bratza,  
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012 and Dirk Voorhoof, “Freedom of Expression, Media and Journalism under the European Human 
Rights System: Characteristics, Developments, and Challenges”, l.c., 59-104. See also Jan Oster, European and International 
Media Law, Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
11
 See Christiana Domínguez, “Inter-American Court of Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights. From 
Observation to Interaction of Human Rights”, in Yves Haeck, Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga and Clara Burbano-Herrera (eds.), The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Theory and Practice, Present and Future, Intersentia 2015, 739-749 and Amrei 
Müller (ed.), Judicial dialogue and human rights, Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
12
 After substantially referring to the case-law of the UN HRC and the IACtHR, the concurring opinion states that the 
approach developed by the ECtHR in the case at issue “is borne out by the above-mentioned case-law of the Human Rights 
Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”. 
 
 
This “judicial dialogue” is also reflected in the reports and submissions of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights13 and in the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, including on issues regarding 
the right to freedom of expression. The IACtHR has indeed a long history of referencing to judgments 
of the ECtHR to support its own opinions and decisions. On issues regarding freedom of expression, 
the IACtHR in its early cases referred to the ECtHR jurisprudence to establish the basic understanding 
of this right and its limitations. Notably, in the advisory opinion 5/85, the IACtHR applied the ECtHR’s 
reasoning of the case Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (6 April 1979) to develop a framework for 
permissible limitations under Article 13 of the American Convention14. In the case Ricardo Canese v. 
Paraguay (2004) and in subsequent cases on conflicts between the right to freedom of expression 
and the protection of the reputation of politicians and public figures, the IACtHR integrated the 
ECtHR’s case law in its reasoning to support the heightened importance of  the right to freedom of 
expression for a democratic society and in the context of elections, including the higher degree of 
tolerance for criticism regarding a politician15. In other cases, such as in Kimel v. Argentina (2 May 
2008) 16, the IACtHR relied on the case law of the ECtHR (Mamère v. France and Castells v. Spain) to 
accept the admissibility of criminal defamation, while also emphasizing with reference to the Grand 
Chamber judgment in Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania that “the imposition of a prison sentence for 
a press offense will be compatible with journalists’ freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 
of the Convention, only in exceptional circumstances, notably where other fundamental rights have 
been seriously impaired, as, for example, in the case of hate speech or incitement to violence”. More 
recently, in the case of Lopez Lone et al. v. Honduras (5 October 2015) concerning the right of 
members of the judiciary to freedom of expression and political participation, the IACtHR referred to 
the cases Wille v. Liechtenstein (28 October 1999, para. 64), and Kudeshkina v. Russia (26 February 
2009, para. 86) and it stated that “(t)he European Court has pointed out that certain restrictions on 
the freedom of expression of judges are necessary in all cases where the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary could be questioned”17. While this principle did not impede the ECtHR  both in Wille v. 
Liechtenstein and in Kudeshkina v. Russia to conclude to the finding of violations of the judges’ right 
to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR, the IACtHR on its turn found a breach of  Article 13 
ACHR in the case of Lopez Lone et al. v. Honduras, emphasizing that “in times of serious democratic 
crisis, such as occurred in the present case, the rules that ordinarily restrict the right to participate in 
politics are not applicable to the actions of judges in defence of the democratic order” (para. 174). 
This report aims to bring the (recent developments in the) case law of the ECtHR, where relevant for 
the adjudication in the case at issue, under the attention of the IACtHR, with the assumption that the 
characteristics, reasoning and findings by the ECtHR in analogue cases may be considered 
“instructive” for the IACtHR, being mindful of the similarities and differences between Article 10 
ECHR and Article 13 ACHR18 and being aware that any inspiration from or reference to other 
                                                          
13
 See e.g. the reference to ECtHR’s judgment in the case of Radio Twist v. Slovakia (broadcasting of illegally obtained copy 
of telephone conversation between two senior state officials) in the Commission’s report on the merits of the case of Rocio 
San Miguel Sosa and others v. Venezuela, in the case nr. 12.923,  OEA/Ser.L/V/II.156, Doc. 21 of 28 October 2015, nr. 56. 
14
 http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_05_ing.pdf, para. 46 and 69. 
15
 http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_111_ing.pdf, paras. 83, 89, 90 and 102. 
16
 http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_177_ing.pdf, para. 78. 
17
 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_302_esp.pdf, para. 170. See also 
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/l%CF%8Cpez-lone-others-v-honduras/ 
18
 Notice e.g. that Article 10 § 1 ECHR does not include a right to “seek” information, while in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. 
Hungary, 8 November 2016, Appl. no. 18030/11, the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) recognizes, under certain circumstances, a 
right to seek and have access to documents held by public authorities under Article 10 ECHR. And although the wording is 
substantially different, both Article 10 § 2 ECHR and Article 13.3 ACHR are limiting the possibility of direct or indirect 
 
 
international instruments of human rights protections should not have a restrictive effect on the 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the ACHR19.  
-6. I confirm that I understand and have complied with my duty to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights to provide independent assistance to the Court on matters within my expertise. 
 
Analysis / Legal opinion 
-1. Is signing a statement or petition in a political context, such as a petition to carry out a recall 
referendum on the term of office of a head of state, to be considered as an act of exercising the 
right to express a (political) opinion, by a civil servant or employee in the public sector, guaranteed 
by Article 19.2 ICCPR and/or Article 10 § 1 ECHR? 
-1.A. First of all it is observed that the right to freedom of expression in the political arena of a 
democracy20 is at the very centre of the rights protected under Article 19 ICCPR and Article 10 ECHR. 
Article 19 ICCPR 
In a recent UN report it is stated that  
“The United Nations has long promoted the idea that expression is fundamental to public participation and debate, 
accountability, sustainable development and human development, and the exercise of all other rights. Indeed, expression 
should provoke controversy, reaction and discourse, the development of opinion, critical thinking, even joy, anger or sadness 
- but not punishment, fear and silence”21. 
 
The UN HRC, in its General Comment nr. 34, states:  
“2. Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable conditions for the full development of the person. They 
are essential for any society. They constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic society. The two freedoms 
are closely related, with freedom of expression providing the vehicle for the exchange and development of opinions. 3. 
Freedom of expression is a necessary condition for the realization of the principles of transparency and accountability that 
are, in turn, essential for the promotion and protection of human rights. 4. Among the other articles that contain guarantees 
for freedom of opinion and/or expression, are articles 18, 17, 25 and 27. The freedoms of opinion and expression form a 
basis for the full enjoyment of a wide range of other human rights. For instance, freedom of expression is integral to the 
enjoyment of the rights to freedom of assembly and association, and the exercise of the right to vote”. 
 
The General Comment nr. 34 has clarified that  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
interferences with the right to freedom of expression. Article 13 ACHR provides: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice. (…) 
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private 
controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any 
other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions”. 
19
  See IACtHR Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of 13 November 1985, paras. 43-52,  at 
http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_05_ing.pdf 
20
 See IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, emphasizing the fundamental nature of freedom of expression for the existence 
of a democratic society: “Freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a democratic society 
rests. It is indispensable for the formation of public opinion. It is also a conditio sine qua non for the development of 
political parties, trade unions, scientific and cultural societies and, in general, those who wish to influence the public. It 
represents, in short, the means that enable the community, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently informed. 
Consequently, it can be said that a society that is not well informed is not a society that is truly free” (para. 70). 
21
 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression, 6 
September 2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/373  
 
 
“the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high, in the circumstances of public debate in a 
democratic society concerning figures in the public and political domain” (para. 34). 
 
Article 10 ECHR 
The ECtHR, at several occasions, has emphasized the crucial value of the right to freedom of political 
expression in a democratic, pluralist and tolerant society: 
“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions 
for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to 
“information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to 
those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there 
is no “democratic society”. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be 
construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly”
22
. 
 
The Court considered that  
“although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that 
the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of 
people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position (..). Pluralism and democracy must be based on 
dialogue and a spirit of compromise, necessarily entailing various concessions on the part of individuals or groups of 
individuals, which are justified in order to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society (..) Respect by 
the State of the views of a minority by tolerating conduct which is not per se incompatible with the values of a democratic 
society or wholly outside the norms of conduct of such a society, far from creating unjust inequalities or discrimination, 
ensures cohesive and stable pluralism and promotes harmony and tolerance in society (..)”
23
. 
 
Furthermore, according to the ECtHR :  
“There is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or debate on matters of public 
interest (..)”
24
. 
 
- 1.B. Next it needs to be examined whether signing a statement or petition in a political context, 
such as a petition to carry out a recall referendum on the term of office of a head of state, is to be 
considered as a relevant act of exercising the right to express a (political) opinion by a civil servant or 
employee in the public sector, guaranteed by Article 19.2 ICCPR and/or Article 10 § 1 ECHR. This 
question concerns two aspects: what kind of forms of expression are protected under Article 19.2 
ICCPR and Article 10 § 1 ECHR (ratione materiae), and can civil servants or persons with an 
employment contract in the public sector rely on the right to freedom of political expression, i.e. in 
terms of applicability of Article 19 ICCPR and Article 10 ECHR ratione personae?  
-1.B.I. Ratione materiae 
Article 19 ICCPR 
According to the UN HRC General Comment nr. 34 (para. 11-12), Article 19.2 ICCPR  
“requires States parties to guarantee the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers. This right includes the expression and receipt of communications of 
every form of idea and opinion capable of transmission to others, subject to the provisions in article 19, paragraph 3, and 
                                                          
22
 See the ECtHR Grand Chamber judgments in Palomo Sánchez a.o. v. Spain, 12 September 2011, App. Nos. 28955/06, 
28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, para. 53, and ECtHR Grand Chamber Baka v. Hungary, 23 June 2016, Appl. no. 
20261/12, para. 158. See also recently ECtHR, Karapetyan and others v. Armenia, 17 November 2016, para. 44 (cfr. infra). 
23
 ECtHR Gough v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 2014, Appl. no. 49327/11, para. 168. 
24
 ECtHR Grand Chamber Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), 8 July 1999, Appl. no. 26682/95, para. 61 and ECtHR Grand Chamber 
Morice v. France, 23 April 2015, Appl. no. 29369/10, para. 125. See also recently: ECtHR Tavares de Almeida Fernandes and 
Almeida Fernandes v. Portugal, 17 January 2017, Appl. no. 31566/13, para. 55. 
 
 
article 20. It includes political discourse,
 
commentary on one’s own and on public affairs, canvassing,
 
discussion of human 
rights (..)”. 
 
The General Comments nr. 34 clarifies that Article 19.2 ICCPR 
 “protects all forms of expression and the means of their dissemination. Such forms include spoken, written and sign 
language and such non-verbal expression as images and objects of art.
 
Means of expression include books, newspapers, 
pamphlets, posters, banners, dress
 
and legal submissions”. 
 
The issuing of a statement, in casu in support of a national strike, is considered by the UN HRC as a 
form of protected expression under Article 19 ICCPR25.  
Article 10 ECHR 
The field of application of Article 10 § 1 ECHR is very broad according to the ECtHR’s case law, and it 
includes all kinds of formats or platforms of channels of expressing, forwarding and receiving ideas 
and opinions, including opinions expressed in an interview, in press releases, posters or leaflets26, 
including lodging a complaint or forwarding documents to the authorities27 and all kind of forms of 
expressive conduct or symbolic speech28. Expressing a political opinion can indeed take many forms, 
including wearing a symbol29, or displaying in public at a location adjacent to Parliament, several 
items of clothing representing the “dirty laundry of the nation”. The ECtHR considered that “this 
action – which the applicants described as a “performance” – amounts to a form of political 
expression”30. A statement, uttered in the presence of journalists, calling to boycott Israeli products, 
is a form of political expression under the protection of Article 10 § 1 ECHR31. In a recent judgment 
the ECtHR found that a state interference, in casu a conviction for defamation, because of the 
reading out of a letter at a public meeting, containing criticism of a public official and demanding for 
his resignation32, amounted to a violation of Article 10 ECHR33.  At several occasions the ECtHR has 
reiterated that “Article 10 protects not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed but 
also the form in which they are conveyed”34. 
                                                          
25
 UN HRC Communication No. 518/1992, Sohn v. Republic of Korea, Views adopted on 18 March 1994. 
26
 ECtHR Vereinigung demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria, 19 December 1994, Appl. no 15153/89; 
ECtHR Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 29 February 2000, Appl. no. 39293/98; ECtHR Kudeshkina v. Russia, 26 February 2009,  Appl. 
no. 29492/05; ECtHR Taffin v. France, 19 February 2010, Appl. no. 42396/04; ECtHR Andrushko v. Russia, 14 October 2010, 
Appl. no. 4260/04; ECtHR Grand Chamber Mouvement raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 13 July 2012, Appl. no. 16354/06; 
ECtHR PETA Deutschland v. Germany, 8 November 2012, Appl. no. 43481/09; ECtHR Erdoğan Gökçe v. Turkey, 14 October 
2014, Appl. no. 31736/04 and ECtHR Annen v. Germany 26 November 2015, Appl. no. 3690/10. 
27
 ECtHR Grand Chamber Guja v. Moldova, 12 February 2008, Appl. no. 14277/04; ECtHR Kayasu v. Turkey, 13 November 
2008, Appl. nos. 64119/00 and 76292/01; ECtHR Frankovicz v. Poland, 16 December 2008, Appl. no. 53025/99; ECtHR 
Heinisch v. Germany, 21 July 2011, Appl. no.  28274/08 and ECtHR Sosinowska v. Poland, 18 October 2011, Appl. no. 
10247/09. 
28
 ECtHR Szel a.o. v. Hungary, 16 September 2014, Appl. no. 44357/13; ECtHR Murat Vural v. Turkey, 14 October 2014, Appl. 
no. 9540/07; ECtHR Gough v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 2014, Appl. no. 49327/11; ECtHR, Novikova a.o. v. Rusland 26 
April 2016, Appl. nos. 25501/07, 57569/11, 80153/12, 5790/13 and 35015/13 and ECtHR Szanyi v. Hungary, 8 November 
2016, Appl. no. 35493/13. 
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 ECtHR Vajnai v. Hungary, 8 July 2008, Appl. no. 33629/06 and ECtHR, Fáber v. Hungary, 24 July 2012, Appl. no. 40721/08, 
in which the Court considered that displaying a symbol as expressing a political view  is a form of protected speech under 
Article 10 ECHR. 
30
 ECtHR Tatár and Fáber v. Hungary, 12 June 2012, Appl. nos. 26005/08 and 26160/08, para. 36. 
31
 ECtHR Willem v. France, 16 July 2009, Appl. no. 10883/05. 
32
 ECtHR Lykin v. Ukraine, 12 January 2017, Appl. no. 19382/08. 
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 Notice that the right to vote (or to take part in a referendum) under Article 3 of the first Protocol to the ECHR is also 
related to the right to freedom of expression. See also Venice Commission, Interpretative Declaration to the Code of Good 
Practice in Electoral Matters on the Publication of Lists of Voters having participated in Elections, 17 October 2016, CDL-
AD(2016)028. 
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 ECtHR De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997, Appl. no. 19983/92, para. 48. 
 
 
 
In Karapetyan and others v. Armenia35 the Court considered Article 10 ECtHR applicable with regard 
the reaction and sanction by the public authorities because of the expression of a political view in a 
public statement by civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In that statement the applicants 
had expressed their concern with the situation created in Armenia and the alleged fraud of the 
election process (in 2008), which, according to the statement “shadow the will of our country and 
society to conduct a civilised, fair and free presidential election”. The statement continued : “As 
citizens of Armenia, we demand that urgent steps be undertaken to call into life the 
recommendations contained in the reports of the international observation mission, as well as other 
prominent international organisations. Only by acting in conformity with the letter and spirit of the 
law can we create democracy and tolerance in Armenia and earn the country a good reputation 
abroad”. The ECtHR found that the applicants’ dismissal from their posts as a result of this statement 
“clearly constituted” an interference with their right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by 
Article 10 § 1 of the Convention36. 
-1.B.II. Ratione personae 
Both Article 19.2 ICCPR and Article 10 § 1 ECHR guarantee the right to freedom of expression and 
information “to everyone”. 
Article 19 ICCPR 
According to the General Comment nr. 34 of the UN HRC, 
 “(t)he obligation to respect freedoms of opinion and expression is binding on every State party as a whole. All branches of 
the State (executive, legislative and judicial) and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level – national, 
regional or local – are in a position to engage the responsibility of the State party. Such responsibility may also be incurred 
by a State party under some circumstances in respect of acts of semi-State entities. The obligation also requires States 
parties to ensure that persons are protected from any acts by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of 
the freedoms of opinion and expression to the extent that these Covenant rights are amenable to application between 
private persons or entities” (para. 7). 
 
The General Comment nr. 34 emphasizes that  Article 19 ICCPR places a particularly high value upon 
uninhibited expression “in the circumstances of public debate in a democratic society concerning figures in the public 
and political domain” (nr. 34), hence protecting all those who participate in public debate on matters in 
the political domain. 
Article 10 ECHR 
The case law of the ECtHR of the last 20 years affirms that employees in the private or public sector 
and civil servants can invoke fundamental rights within the labour environment or in fulfilling their 
tasks in the public sector37. In Vogt v. Germany the Grand Chamber clarified that 
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 Karapetyan a.o. v. Armenia, 17 November 2016, Appl. no. 59001/08,  par. 36 (non-final judgment, still open for referral to 
Grand Chamber, cfr. infra). In this case, the ECtHR came to the conclusion that the inference with the applicants’ right to 
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in the third chapter of this report, explaining and highlighting the specific circumstances of the case, which resulted 
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 Dirk Voorhoof and Patrick Humblet, “The Right to Freedom of Expression in the Workplace under Article 10 ECHR” in Filip 
Dorssemont, Klaus Lörcher and Isabelle Schömann (eds.), The European Convention of Human Rights and the Employment 
 
 
 “civil servants do not fall outside the scope of the Convention. In Articles 1 and 14 (art. 1, art. 14), the Convention stipulates 
that "everyone within [the] jurisdiction" of the Contracting States must enjoy the rights and freedoms in Section I "without 
discrimination on any ground". Moreover Article 11 para. 2 (art. 11-2) in fine, which allows States to impose special 
restrictions on the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and association by "members of the armed forces, of the police or of 
the administration of the State", confirms that as a general rule the guarantees in the Convention extend to civil servants”
38
. 
 
Employees, members of the administration of the State and civil servants have the right to freedom 
of expression, at the workplace and outside the workplace. Since the ECtHR made clear “that Article 10 
applies also to the workplace, and that civil servants (…) enjoy the right to freedom of expression”39, the application of 
Article 10 ECHR to employees, both in the public and private sector, can no longer be disputed under 
the ECHR40. Whether the applicants are civil servants and have the status as “public officials”, or are 
employed at a Ministry or another public institution or public agency under a regular or statutory 
labor agreement does not affect their right to freedom of expression41. In Baka v. Hungary the Grand 
Chamber confirmed this approach in holding that “civil servants are individuals and, as such, qualify for the 
protection of Article 10 of the Convention”
42.  
According to the ECtHR “civil servants enjoy the freedom to express their opinions and ideas under Article 10 of the 
Convention, like all other individuals”, and therefore “Contracting States must allow a certain space in domestic public 
debate, even in difficult times, for the participation of civil servants, in particular where their experience and expertise may 
be conducive to an informed debate on issues of public interest and importance”
43. 
 
The Grand Chamber in Baka v. Hungary leaves no doubt that “(t)he Court has recognised in its case-law the 
applicability of Article 10 to civil servants in general (..)”
44.  
 
The case law of the ECtHR shows that freedom of expression pursuant to Article 10 ECHR applies 
both to civil servants, as employees of public authorities or as public officials or judges, and to 
employees in the private sector. Comparative law-research has also shown that rules in labour 
contracts, in labour codes or norms applicable to public servants, governing the exercise of freedom 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Relation, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013, 237-286. See also T. Novitz and C. Fenwick, “The Application of Human Rights 
Discourse to Labour Relations: Translation of Theory into Practice”, in C. Fenwich and T. Novitz (eds.), Human Rights at 
Work, Oxford, Hart Publishers, 2010.  
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general”, and “It has further found that Article 10 of the Convention also applies when the relations between employer and 
employee are governed, as in the case at hand, by private law and that the State has a positive obligation to protect the 
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 See also ECtHR Peev v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2007, Appl. no. 64209/01; ECtHR Heinisch v. Germany, 21 July 2008, Appl. no. 
28274/08 and ECtHR Frankovicz v. Poland, 16 December 2008, Appl. no. 53025/99. 
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of expression of staff members may be imposed on public officials, “whether or not they have “civil 
servant” status”45. 
 
-2. Under what circumstances a termination of employment contract or dismissal of an employer 
or civil servant is to be regarded as an interference with the right to freedom of expression, 
particular in case the public authority or employer argues that the termination of contract or 
dismissal is unrelated to the exercise of the right of freedom of expression by the public sector 
employee or civil servant? 
At several occasions the ECtHR has considered dismissals, termination of employment contract  or 
disciplinary sanctions of employees or civil servants not only as interferences with their right to 
freedom of expression protected under Article 10 ECHR, but also as violations of this right (cfr. 
infra)46. In Heinisch v. Germany the Court considered “that the applicant’s dismissal, as confirmed by the 
German courts, on account of her criminal complaint against her employer constituted an interference with her right to 
freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention”
 47
. 
 
In some cases the ECtHR disagreed with the national government’s argumentation that the dismissal, 
termination of contract or other disciplinary measure was unrelated to the exercise of the applicants’ 
(civil servants’) right to freedom of expression48. In such cases the ECtHR examines whether the 
interference or measure complained of is to be considered as a reaction or sanction because of the 
expression of certain opinions or statements uttered by the applicant as public official, civil servant, 
or judge49. Therefore the ECtHR determines the real character and scope of the measure by putting 
it in the context of the facts of the case. The Court in such circumstances therefore “deems it 
necessary to recall the sequence of events”, an approach that is clearly illustrated in the 2016 Grand 
Chamber’s judgment in Baka v. Hungary50. In Baka v. Hungary the Hungarian authorities argued that 
there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression, since the termination of 
his mandate as President of the Supreme Court “had no relation to the opinions expressed by him. The fact that 
the public expression of his opinions pre-dated the termination of his mandate was not sufficient to prove that there was a 
causal relationship between them”
51. According to the Hungarian Government Mr. Baka’s “mandate had been 
terminated because of the fundamental changes in the functions of the supreme judicial authority in Hungary. The function 
to which he had been elected (comprising a mixture of administrative and judicial functions) had ceased to exist upon the 
entry into force of the new Fundamental Law of Hungary” (para. 131). 
 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR however disagreed with this point of view :  
“in cases concerning disciplinary proceedings, removal or appointment of judges, the Court has had to ascertain first 
whether the measure complained of amounted to an interference with the exercise of the applicant’s freedom of expression 
– in the form of a “formality, condition, restriction or penalty” (..). In order to answer this question, the scope of the measure 
must be determined by putting it in the context of the facts of the case and of the relevant legislation” (paras. 141 and 143).  
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Such an examination by the ECtHR is held “in the light of the general principles emerging from its case-law on the 
assessment of evidence”, in which the Court applies the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”” (para. 
143). The Court “adopts those conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including 
such inferences as may flow from the facts in their entirety and from the parties’ submissions. According to its established 
case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar 
unrebutted presumptions of fact” (para. 143).  
 
After having examined the sequence of events in their entirety, the Grand Chamber came to the 
view that “there is prima facie evidence of a causal link between the applicant’s exercise of his freedom of expression and 
the termination of his mandate. This is corroborated by the numerous documents submitted by the applicant which refer to 
the widespread perception that such a causal link existed” (para. 148). 
 
The Court inter alia referred to several speeches, to a letter to the President of the Republic and the 
Prime Minister, and to a public communiqué issued by the applicant. In these speeches and it this 
statements the applicant, in his capacity as President of the Supreme Court and the National Council 
of Justice, publicly expressed his views on various legislative reforms affecting the judiciary and in 
which he “strongly criticized” some of the proposals and stated that the reform would lead to 
““excessive”, “unconstitutional” and “uncontrollable” powers” (para. 145). 
The ECtHR is also  “of the view that once there is prima facie evidence in favour of the applicant’s version of the events 
and the existence of a causal link, the burden of proof should shift to the Government. This is particularly important in the 
case at hand, since the reasons behind the termination of the applicant’s mandate lie within the knowledge of the 
Government and were never established or reviewed by an independent court or body” (para. 149).  
The ECtHR in Baka v. Hungary came to conclusion  “that the Government has failed to show convincingly that 
the impugned measure was prompted by the suppression of the applicant’s post and functions in the context of the reform 
of the supreme judicial authority. Accordingly, it agrees with the applicant that the premature termination of his mandate 
was prompted by the views and criticisms that he had publicly expressed in his professional capacity” (para. 151).  
Therefore the termination of the applicant’s mandate constituted an interference with the exercise 
of his right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention (para. 153)52. 
 
-3. What are the limits of the right to political freedom of expression for employees and civil 
servants when expressing political, critical or non-neutral opinions about the head of state, the 
government or other public institutions and what are the relevant criteria and conditions that may 
justify an interference with the right to (political) freedom of expression of civil servants or 
employees in the public sector? Or formulated in another way: in what circumstances an 
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 For a similar approach, see also ECtHR Wille v. Liechtenstein, 28 October 1999, Appl. no. 28396/95 and ECtHR Kudeshkina 
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interference with the right to (political) freedom of expression of public servants amounts to a 
violation of Article 19 ICCPR or Article 10 ECHR? 
Article 19 ICCPR 
The General Comment No. 34 clarifying the application of Article 19 ICCPR refers to the UN HRC 
General Comment No. 25 “on participation in public affairs and the right to vote”, in which it 
elaborated on the importance of freedom of expression for the conduct of public affairs and the 
effective exercise of the right to vote. It also states that “the free communication of information and ideas 
about public and political issues (..) is essential” (para. 20).  
 
Article 19.3 ICCPR expressly states that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with 
it special duties and responsibilities. For this reason two limitative areas of restrictions on the right 
are permitted, which may relate either to respect of the rights or reputations of others or to the 
protection of national security or of public order (ordre public) or of public health or morals (para. 
21). This provision lays down  
“specific conditions and it is only subject to these conditions that restrictions may be imposed: the restrictions must be 
“provided by law”; they may only be imposed for one of the grounds set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; 
and they must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality. Restrictions are not allowed on grounds not 
specified in paragraph 3, even if such grounds would justify restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant. 
Restrictions must be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related to the 
specific need on which they are predicated” (para. 21). 
 
For the purposes of Article 19.3 ICCPR, a norm for to be characterized as a “law”, must be formulated 
“with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to 
the public. A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its 
execution” (para. 25).  
 
Most importantly, “restrictions must be “necessary” for a legitimate purpose”. General Comment No. 
34 clarifies that “when a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must 
demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and proportionality 
of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the expression and 
the threat” (paras. 33-35). It is  up to a State party in any given case, to “demonstrate in specific fashion the 
precise nature of the threat to any of the enumerated grounds listed in paragraph 3 that has caused it to restrict freedom of 
expression” (para. 34).  
 
The UN HRC has also pointed out that restrictions on “political discourse” cause for concern and that 
“in circumstances of public debate concerning public figures in the political domain and public institutions, the value placed 
by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high”. 
 
The General Comment No. 34 emphasizes that  
“all public figures, including those exercising the highest political authority such as heads of state and government, are 
legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition” (paras. 37-38). 
 
Article 10 ECHR 
As a starting point, it needs to be reiterated that the ECtHR, at several occasions, has emphasized the 
crucial value of the right to freedom of political expression in a democratic, pluralist and tolerant 
society. According to the ECtHR there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 ECHR for restrictions on 
political speech or debate on matters of public interest (see supra). 
 
 
The crucial issue is to know where the limits and restrictions of the employee’s right to freedom of 
expression are to be situated, as the exercise of this freedom carries with it “duties and 
responsibilities” (Article 10 § 2 ECHR). Indeed, Article 10 § 1 ECHR stipulates the principle of the right 
to freedom of expression, while Article 10 § 2 ECHR, by referring to “duties and responsibilities” that 
go together with the exercise of this freedom, opens the possibility for public authorities to interfere 
with this freedom by way of formalities, conditions, restrictions and even penalties. Yet, the main 
characteristic of Article 10 § 2 ECHR is that, by imposing three conditions that need to be 
cumulatively fulfilled, it substantially reduces the possibility of interference with the right to express, 
receive and impart information and ideas. Interferences by public authorities with the right to 
freedom of expression are only allowed under the strict conditions that they must be “prescribed by 
law”, must have a “legitimate aim” and finally and most decisively, must be “necessary in a 
democratic society”. The most important question that is to be answered in concrete cases refers to 
the “pressing social need”, in order to pertinently and sufficiently justifying the (proportionate 
character) of an interference with the right to freedom of expression, as being necessary in a 
democratic society.  
This report does not further elaborate on the conditions of “prescribed by law”53, or whether an 
interference at issue pursued one or more of the legitimate aims under Article 10 § 2 ECHR54. 
However, in case a dismissal or termination of employment is effectively to be considered as an 
implicit or hidden sanction and hence as an interference with an employee’s or civil servant’s right to 
freedom of expression, both these conditions under Article 10 § 2 ECHR must be fulfilled. When a 
termination of contract is presented as the exercise of a discretional contractual power by the 
employer, - this being  eventually a veil of legality for the true motivation to punish the applicant 
employees or civil servants for their expression of a political opinion, by signing a petition with a 
political message -, this termination of contract or employment is to be regarded as an implicit 
sanction, constituting an interference with the right to freedom of expression of the applicant. In 
such circumstances it is up to the national authorities to clearly identify the legal basis and to 
motivate pertinently the legal aim of the interference at issue55. Subsequently it is up to the ECtHR to 
evaluate whether the interference at issue is prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, in 
accordance with its standard case law on this matter. In cases where there are clear doubts whether 
the interference at issue was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, it can still be 
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considered relevant and important to examine whether the impugned interference was “necessary in 
a democratic society”56. 
In order to evaluate the third and decisive condition on the necessity in a democratic society, the 
ECtHR will look at all the elements of the case, taking into considerations a set of criteria. The 
ECtHR’s task is to determine whether the applicants’ dismissal corresponded to a “pressing social 
need” and whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”. 
In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were 
in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 ECHR and, moreover, that they based their 
decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts. In cases related to interferences with 
the right to freedom of political expression in an employment relation of public service, the most 
relevant criteria are57: 
1. The content of the opinion or publication, bearing in mind whether or not the opinion contributes to a  public 
debate or relates to a matter of public interest 
2. The  medium or platform in which the statements were made public 
3. The social context of the statements, including the timing or political situation 
4. The nature of the employee’s position within the public service 
5. The manner in which the opinions or statements were expressed 
6. The spontaneous or non-spontaneous nature of the opinions or statement 
7. The impact on the relationship with the employer or the State, including the comparative assessment or 
balancing of the duty of loyalty and the right to freedom of expression 
8. The procedural guarantees and the type of judicial control regarding the interference at issue  
9. The gravity of the sanction in respect of the (concrete) consequences for the employee  
10. The possible  ‘chilling effect’ flowing from a State authority or an employer’s interference with an employee’s 
freedom of expression.  
 
While the protection of Article 10 ECHR extends to the workplace in general and to public servants or 
staff members working in the public sector in particular (cfr. supra), employees and civil servants at 
the same time owe to their employer a duty of loyalty, reserve and discretion58. The ECtHR has 
made it clear however that civil servants do have the right to freedom of expression as an individual 
and that they have the right to participate in public discussions, precisely because of their 
involvement or expertise they can make an important contribution to the debate in society on 
matters of public interest59. At the same time civil servants can be subjected to far-reaching 
limitations on their freedom of expression, notably when because of the nature of their office or 
position they handle secret, confidential or sensitive information. A civil servant working at the 
Ministry of Defence or a soldier leaking or revealing secret military information will find it hard to 
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invoke his or her right of freedom of expression.60 Judges are also subject to special restrictions61, 
due to the necessity of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary and upholding the perception 
of impartiality.  
The case law of the ECtHR demonstrates however that even in those cases the restrictions or 
sanctions have to be relevant and proportionate, and that restrictions, disciplinary measures or 
other sanctions can indeed be considered to be an unlawful infringement of the right to freedom of 
expression of military personnel, civil servants, judges or employees in the public sector62. Although 
the ECtHR does not disregard the duty of  “loyalty, reserve and discretion”, the Court has emphasised  
the context of the public debate in which the civil servants’ or the judges’ statements took place. 
According to the ECtHR generalisations and exaggeration are intrinsic to  political speech. It matters 
that allegations and critical statements are based on facts. The ECtHR also refers to the  “chilling 
effect” of the fear for sanctions on the exercise of the freedom of speech63. Furthermore,  
“Contracting States must allow a certain space in domestic public debate, even in difficult times, for the participation of civil 
servants, in particular where their experience and expertise may be conducive to an informed debate on issues of public 
interest and importance”
64
. 
The ECtHR has usually considered dismissal from employment or termination of contract to be a very 
harsh measure, particularly when other more lenient and more appropriate disciplinary sanctions 
could or should have been envisaged65. In Fuentes Bobo v. Spain the ECtHR held that the dismissal of 
an employee because of criticism on his employer is a sanction indicating “une sévérité extrême, 
alors que d'autres sanctions disciplinaires, moins lourdes et plus appropriées, auraient pu être 
envisages”66. In assessing the gravity of the sanction the Court took into account that the dismissal 
without any compensation had extremely far-reaching consequences for the employee concerned.67  
In evaluating the (non)compliance with Article 10, the ECtHR must look at the impugned interference 
“in the light of the case as a whole”, while attaching particular importance to the office held by the 
applicants, the form and content of their statements and the context in which they were made68.  
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Karapetyan a.o. v. Armenia69 concerns a case of a dismissal of four civil servants working for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Armenia for issuing a public statement in breach of the Rules of the 
Diplomatic Service Act. In the statement at issue the applicants had expressed their concern with the 
situation created in Armenia after the February 2008 elections and the alleged fraud of the election 
process, which, according to the statement “shadow the will of our country and society to conduct a 
civilised, fair and free presidential election”. And the statement continued : “As citizens of Armenia, 
we demand that urgent steps be undertaken to call into life the recommendations contained in the 
reports of the international observation mission, as well as other prominent international 
organisations. Only by acting in conformity with the letter and spirit of the law can we create 
democracy and tolerance in Armenia and earn the country a good reputation abroad” (para. 10). The 
names of the applicants, with the indication of their office, appeared under the statement. The  
statement was reported by several mass media outlets in Armenia. 
In Karapetyan a.o. v. Armenia the ECtHR found that the dismissal of the applicants from their posts 
was an interference with their right to freedom of (political) expression70, but it found no violation of 
Article 10 ECHR, considering “the particular circumstances of the present case as a whole” (para. 59).  
The Court concluded:  
“As to the sanction, the Court considers that the dismissal of the applicants, although severe, did not constitute a 
disproportionate measure taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and the available options under 
domestic law. Against this background, and taking account of all of the elements described above, the Court finds that the 
Government have demonstrated that the measures taken against the applicants were based on relevant and sufficient 
grounds and were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court accordingly finds that there has been no violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention” (paras. 60-62). 
 
It also recalled that  
“in view of the particular history of a Contracting State, the national authorities may, so as to ensure the consolidation and 
maintenance of democracy, consider it necessary to have constitutional safeguards to achieve the aim in a democratic 
society of having a politically neutral body of civil servants, including the diplomatic corps, by restricting the freedom of civil 
servants to engage in political activities” (paras. 49 and 59). 
 
Because this judgment refers explicitly and repeatedly to the particular circumstances of the case 
and to the particular history and situation in Armenia (in 2008), it is important to highlight these 
specific facts and particular characteristics of the case at issue, in contrast with those in the case of 
Rocio San Miguel Sosa and others v. Venezuela 
- In Karapetyan a.o. v. Armenia there is no ambiguity on the contents of a specific legal norm on which the 
dismissal of the diplomats was based. The Diplomatic Service Act clearly provides that a diplomat shall be 
dismissed from office if he violates the restrictions enumerated in section 44 of the Act. According to section 44, 
subsection 1, point (c), of the Diplomatic Service Act, a diplomat has no right to use his official capacity and work 
facilities for the benefit of parties and non-governmental organisations (including religious ones), or in order to 
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carry out other political or religious activity (para. 24 and 37-43). Hence the inference was prescribed by law and 
the applicants should or could have been aware of the consequences of their act. The ECtHR finds that the 
possibility that a diplomat could be dismissed on the basis of Section 44 of the Diplomatic Service Act cannot be 
regarded as unforeseeable. The Act was enacted to cover professional conduct of diplomats, who formed a 
specific and restricted group. The ECtHR therefore agrees with the Armenian Government that the applicants, 
who were all professional diplomats and who had worked in this field for more than 10 years, could not therefore 
claim to be ignorant of the content of the said provision. 
- It has not been disputed in this case that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting national 
security and public safety as well as preventing disorder, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 (para. 43). 
- The applicants all had a diplomatic status, dealing with sensitive national and international issues. They occupied 
high-ranked posts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely Head of Press and Information Department, Head 
of NATO Division of Arms Control and International Security Department, Counsel of the European Department 
and Head of USA and Canada Division of the American Department (para. 6). The ECtHR found that the Armenian 
authorities were entitled to have regard to the requirement that high-ranking civil servants with diplomatic 
status such as the applicants respected and ensured the special bond of trust and loyalty between them and the 
State in the performance of their functions (para. 54-55). 
- The applicants issued the statement not as individuals or individual citizens: their names  with the indication of 
their office, appeared under the statement (para. 11). By indicating their official titles in the published statement, 
the applicants had made use of their official capacity (para. 56). 
- According to the ECtHR, the domestic court took into account the applicants’ right to freedom of expression in its 
overall assessment of the applicants’ claims in a manner sufficiently in conformity with the requirements of the 
ECHR (para. 56). 
- Viewing the particular circumstances of the present case as a whole, the Court considers that no evidence has 
been adduced that could call into question the respondent State’s assessment in this matter: to ensure the 
consolidation and maintenance of democracy (paras. 49 and 59). 
- The applicants were not dismissed because of the political content of their statement as such, but because of the 
publicity they gave to it, expressed in their function. The Government in this case has also argued that “diplomats 
were completely free in their political opinions as long as these were not pronounced publicly” and that “the 
statement had also been discussed in the media and this had impaired the political neutrality and reputation of 
the diplomatic staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (para. 35). In essence the applicants breached the 
prohibition for diplomats to use their official capacity and work facilities for expressing a clear “political 
assessment of election and post-election events” (para. 55). 
- As to the sanction, the Court considers that the dismissal of the applicants, although severe, did not constitute a 
disproportionate measure taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and the available options 
under domestic law (para. 60). 
It is to be noticed that apart from a different factual context compared to the case of Rocio San 
Miguel Sosa and others v. Venezuela71, the chamber judgment in the case of Karapetyan a.o. v. 
Armenia is not final yet. The judgment is also highly controversial, as it seems to go against some of 
the principles and approach in the Grand Chamber’s judgment in the case of Baka v. Hungary (cfr. 
supra). In a dissenting opinion judge Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska emphasizes that it does not 
emerge from the reasoning of the domestic courts what “pressing social need” existed to justify, as 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, the protection of the Armenian State’s interests over 
the applicants’ right to freedom of expression. Moreover she notes that the Court has usually 
considered dismissal from employment to be a very harsh measure, particularly when other more 
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lenient and more appropriate disciplinary sanctions could or should have been envisaged, while it 
appears that the domestic authorities did not consider the imposition of other sanctions, but instead 
proceeded instantly, as a result of applicants’ actions, to their dismissal from office. Furthermore, the 
effects of the applicants’ dismissal were severe, as they were deprived of the opportunity to exercise 
the profession for which they had a calling, for which they had been trained and in which they had 
acquired skills and experience. Even taking into account the difficult political situation at the time 
and allowing the national authorities a certain margin of appreciation, to dismiss the applicants from 
their posts as diplomats was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, according to the 
dissenting opinion. Therefore judge Trajkovska regrets being unable to agree to a finding of no 
violation of Article 10 in this case. In her view, this case should be referred to the Grand Chamber. 
A similar critical comment is formulated on the blog “Strasbourg Observers”, of the Human Rights 
Centre of Ghent University, Belgium72. According to Stijn Smet “(t)he Court’s emphasis on ‘a 
politically neutral body of civil servants’ in Karapetyan is troublesome, because it appears to reduce 
civil servants to mere lackeys of the executive, rather than potential defenders of democracy. Yet, 
there are good reasons to consider the alternative viewpoint”. He considers the majority finding in 
Karapetyan a.o. v. Armenia “worrying”, because it bars senior civil servants from speaking out in 
defence of democracy and the rule of law. He concludes: “In her dissenting opinion in Karapetyan, 
judge Lazarova Trajkovska noted that the case ‘should be referred to the Grand Chamber’. She has a 
point”. 
 
In this chapter (nr. 3) is has been clarified that although the ECtHR does not disregard the duty of  
“loyalty, reserve and discretion” by civil servants, the Court at several occasions has emphasised  the 
context of the public debate in which statements uttered by employees in the civil sector took place. 
Apart from referring to the danger of a “chilling effect” because of the fear for sanctions on the 
exercise of the freedom of speech, the authorities “must allow a certain space in domestic public 
debate, even in difficult times, for the participation of civil servants”. Accepting the legitimate and 
justified character of a dismissal or termination of contract of an employee as an interference with 
his or her right of freedom of expression, risks to curtail that right itself and stifle freedom of 
expression and public debate. It has been clarified that the characteristics and facts in the case 
Karapetyan a.o. v. Armenia are in many aspects different from those in the case of Rocio San Miguel 
Sosa and others v. Venezuela, apart from the circumstance that the judgment of the ECtHR in  
Karapetyan a.o. v. Armenia is not final yet and subject to robust controversy. 
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Summary/conclusion 
This report substantiates that according to the standards of Article 19 ICCPR and Article 10 ECHR, civil 
servants or employees in the public sector do have a right to freedom of political expression, and 
that signing a petition to carry out a recall referendum on the term of office of a head of state, is to 
be considered as an act of exercising the right to express a (political) opinion. It has also been 
substantiated that a dismissal, allegedly because of singing the petition at issue, amounts to an 
interference with the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 19 ICCPR and Article 
10 ECHR. Therefore such an interference with the employees’ or civil servants’ right can only be 
justified under the strict conditions of Article 19.2 ICCPR and Article 10 § 2 ECHR. According to these 
international standards, interferences by public authorities with the right to freedom of expression 
are only allowed under the strict conditions that they must be “prescribed by law”, have a 
“legitimate aim” and finally and most decisively, they must be “necessary in a democratic society”. 
The most important and crucial issue is whether there is a “pressing social need”, in order to 
pertinently and sufficiently justifying the (proportionate character) of an interference with the right 
to freedom of expression, as being necessary in a democratic society.  
In the General Comment nr. 34 it is emphasized that “the value placed by the Covenant upon 
uninhibited expression is particularly high, in the circumstances of public debate in a democratic 
society concerning figures in the public and political domain” (para. 34) and according to the ECtHR   
“(t)here is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or 
debate on matters of public interest (..)”73. 
According to the ECtHR “Contracting States must allow a certain space in domestic public debate, 
even in difficult times, for the participation of civil servants, in particular where their experience and 
expertise may be conducive to an informed debate on issues of public interest and importance”74. 
It is beyond the scope of this report to evaluate the facts in Rocio San Miguel Sosa and others v. 
Venezuela, nr. 12.923, “in the light of the case as a whole”, from the perspective of Article 13 ACHR. 
From the perspective of Article 19 ICCPR and Article 10 ECHR, when evaluating the necessity of the 
applicants’ dismissal or termination of contract, particular importance is to be attached “to the office 
held by the applicants, the form and content of their statements and the context in which they 
were made”, as well as the nature and severity of the interference. Apart from the unclear situation 
whether such a measure was prescribed by law and pursues a legitimate aim under Article 19 ICCPR 
or Article 10 ECHR, it is not pertinently demonstrated that the measure at issue responds to a 
pressing social need and whether it pertinently and sufficiently can be held as being necessary in a 
democratic society, taking into consideration that the right to freedom of expression, together with 
the right to vote, are at the very centre of the political arena of a democratic society. The dismissal 
or termination of contract in such circumstances is to be considered as a disproportionate measure, 
with a severe impact on the applicants’ rights and life and having a chilling effect on other 
employees in the public sector for the fear of sanctions on exercising their right to freedom of 
(political) expression, taking part in public debate on crucial matters within a democratic society. 
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